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15 THE NEW CENSORSHIP 
A Case Study of the Extrajudicial Restraints on Free Speech 
Paul Cliteur, Tom Herrenberg and Bastiaan Rijpkema' 
'fhe central assumption of this contribution is that the limits of free speech are, to an 
increasing extent, not established by the legislature or the judiciary, but by terrorist orga-
nizations and terrorist individuals- in such a way that it amounts to anew kind of censor-
ship. At least, this is the case with regard to a particular kind of speech: Religious criticism 
or religious satire. Freedom of speech is nowadays 'freedom of speech in an age of 
theoterrorism.'1 This means that freedom of speech is acc:ompanied by many factual con-
straints which are real limits on the free speech for the persons concerned, namely, those 
targeted by terrorist assault. The general public feigns ignorance, however, along with 
leading politicians. In a study of five major cases: The Carrell Affair, the Cartoon Affair, 
the Rushdie Affair, the Terry Jones Affair (better known as the Koran-burning pastor), 
and the Youssef Affair (better known as the creator of the Innocence of Muslims video), 
we hope to clarify the predicament our civil rights seem to be in. 
The three authors of this contribution have all done research on one or more of these 
cases. Cliteur has studied the Carrell, Cartoon and Rushdie Affairs,2 Rijpkemahas studied 
the case of the American maverick Koran-burning pastor Terry Jones,3 and Herrenberg 
has studied the most recent case, that of Mark Basseley Youssef, who was the creator of 
an insignificant satire on the prophet Mohammed which, months after it was posted on 
the Internet, was the center of controversy in many parts of the world.4 In all of these cases, 
* 
1 
2 
3 
4 
We want to thank the participants in a colloquium at the department of Jurisprudence, Leiden University, 
for the critical discussion of an earlier version of this chapter. In particular we want to thank: Yoram Stein, 
Machteld Zee, Roy van Keulen, janneke V ink, Zhang Tu, Sarah Strous and Mirjam van Schaik. 
The term "theoterrorism" is used for terrorism which finds its source and justification in a conception of 
God. We cannot, within the context of this contribution, explain and justify why we think this is useful 
vocabulary and have to refer to: Cliteur, Paul, "The Challenge ofTheoterrorism", in: The New English Review, 
30 May 2013, full text: www.newenglishreview.org/Paul_Cliteur/The_Challenge_of_ Theoterrorism/. 
Cliteur, Paul, "Van Rushdie tot jones: over geweld en uitingsvrijheid", in: Afshin Ellian, Gelijn Molier and 
Tom Zwart, Eds., Mag ik dit zeggen? Beschouwingen over de vrijheid van meningsuiting, Boom Juridische 
uitgevers, The Hague 2011, pp. 67-89. 
Rijpkema, Bastiaan, «-yrijheid van meningsuiting in de val tussen religieus extremisme en utilitarisme", in: 
Nederlands furistenblad, afl. 44/45, 14 December 2012, pp. 3106-3111. 
Herrenberg, Tom, "Politici, de vrijheid van meningsuiting en Innocence of Muslims", in: Nederlands ]uris-
tenblad, afl. 33, 27 September 2013, pp. 2255·2259; Herrenberg, Tom, "Vrijheid van meningsuiting in de 
multiculturele samenleving: evaluatie van twee tegenstrijdige interpretaties", in: Civis Mundi, 14 January 
2014. 
291 
PAuL CLITEUR, ToM HERRENBERG AND BAsTIAAN RIJPKEMA 
threats avd (attempted) murders were the results, while western politiciavs tried to appease 
the avger of violent crowds and reassure their colleagues in other parts of the world that 
they did 'not agree' with the expressions. The defense of free speech that some of them 
presented was so weak that it bordered on making excuses for haviDg a constitution, a 
democracy, and freedom of the press. The present contribution tries to tie together the 
research done on the several individual cases. 
The Netherlavds is an interesting country to start our study of this perplexing phe-
nomenon. The Netherlavds is central to our subject, because what took place here could 
be considered as the catalyst: The cavcellation offourteen seconds of satire by the Germav-
Dutch show master Rudi Carrell in 1987. From here, it seems the story unfolds automatically 
to the predicament we now fmd ourselves in. So let us start with this memorable piece of 
satire in 1987. 
5 
THE CARRELL AFFAIR IN GERMANY 
On New Year's Eve, 1987 (Sylvester in Germav), Germav television broadcast some high-
lights from the 'comedy show'6 of Rudi Carrell (1934-2006). Carrell was a Dutch-born 
entertainer who became one of the most beloved show masters on Germav television. 
Successes in his home country led him to seek new challenges. In 1965, he moved to Ger-
mavy. The Rudi Carrell Show (1965-1972) avd Rudi's Tagesshow (1981-1987) were huge 
successes. Carrell's audiences made up about two-thirds of all Germav TV viewers. On at 
least one occasion, in 1987, he drew a viewership of twenty million people.7 The item in 
question, which was watched by av audience of 20.5 million people," was the cause of a 
diplomatic controversy with enormous ramifications. It was a spoof, broadcast on SUl)day 
15 February, 1987, in which Carrell used cinematic tricks to make it appear as if women 
were throwing their underwear at the feet of Irav' s Ayatollalr Ruhollalr Khomeini! 
Only seconds after Carrell's show aired, Reinhard Schlagintweit (b. 1928), the civil 
servavt of the Germav government responsible for contact with the Middle East, received 
a call.10 On the phone was Mohammad Djavad Salari (b. 1951), the Iraniav ambassador in 
Bonn since 1984. He was very angry. Was Schlagintweit aware that the 'highest supervisor 
of all Muslims' ('das geistliche Oberhaupt aller Muslime') had just been insulted? Not only 
5 Parts of the following discussion of the Carrell Affair appeared in: Cliteur, Paul, "The Rudi Carrell Affair 
and its Significance for the Tension between theoterrorism and religious satire,, in: Ancilla Iuris, 2013: 15, 
pp. 15-41, full text: www.anci.ch/paul_cliteur. 
6 "Risque spoof on Khomeini sparks Iranian uproar", in: Associated Press, 17 February 1987. 
7 "Rudi Carrell", in: Britannica Online Encyclopedia. 
8 "Tehran expels two W. Germans", in: The Washington Post, 18 February 1987. 
9 See for an analysis of Carrell's humor: Lixfeld, Hannjost, "Witz und soziale Wirklichkeit: Bemerkungen zur 
interdiszipliniiren Witzforscbung", in: Fabula, Vol. 25, nr. 3-4, September 2009, pp. 183-213. 
10 "Carrell-Affare: nicbtklug", in: Der Spiegel, Nr. 9, 23 February 1987, pp. 25-27, p. 25. 
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bad the Iranian people's religious feelings been hurt, but those of Muslims 'all over the 
We have to study the argument disclosed m this conversation carefully, since it is 
characteristic of a way of thinking which is widespread, and at the heart of the phenomenon 
we are discussing m this essay. What does Salari contend? He claimed that criticism of 
Khomeini (a respected cleric from his perspective, a brutal dictator from another) was not 
only the criticism of one specific dictator but an msult to a whole country. And not only 
an insult to a whole country, but also to its citizens. And not only to its citizens, but also 
to the religion those citizens are supposed to share: Islam. And not only the specific funda-
mentalist interpretation of Islam put forward by the Iranian theocracy, but Islam tout 
court. So by a simple sleight of hand, criticism of one specific dictator became criticism of 
one fifth of the world's population. In the Iranian culture, Salari indicated, it was 
'unthinkable' to mock Ayatollah Khomemi.12 And, most importantly, he promised that 
there would be consequences, though he did not specify them. 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF CARRELL's SPOOF 
One of those consequences proved to be the closure of the Iranian consulates in West 
Berlm and Hamburg which, in itself, was not a great problem. Another consequence was 
that an Iran Air flight from Frankfurt to Tehran was delayed for six and a half hours due 
to an Iran Air personnel strike in protest against the show.13 Which was not a great problem 
either. Tehran had ordered the strike, as Saeed Kamyak, the airline's operations director 
for West Germany, mdicated. Yet another consequence of Carrell's perceived insult was 
tirat on 18 February, Iran ordered two West German diplomats to leave Iran in retaliation 
for Carrell's spoof of Khomeini.14 Anotirer mconvenience, perhaps, but not sometirmg 
tirat would unsettle the way the world is organized. Furthermore: Germany's ambassador, 
Armm Freitag, was summoned to the Foreign Ministry and handed a 'strongly worded 
protest note on the insulting program.'15 Also, on 18 February, Iranian students staged a 
protest at tire West German embassy, chanting anti-U.S. and anti-West German slogans. 
The students demanded an official apology from Bonn about Carrell's spoof.16 In addition, 
tire Goethe Cultural Institute in Tehran was dosed in retaliation for the broadcast of Car-
11 Ibid., p. 25. 
12 Ibid., p. 26. 
13 "'West German spoof ofKhomeini sparks Iranian protests", in: Associated Press, 17 February 1987. 
14 "Tehran expels two W. Germans", in: The Washington Post, 18 February 1987; "Iran expels two German 
diplomats in retaliation for TV spoof', in: Associated Press, 17 February 1987. 
15 "'West German spoof ofKhomeini sparks Iranian protests", in: Associated Press, 17 February 1987. 
16 "Iran miffed over Khomeini spoof on German TV", in: Tampa Bay Times, 19 February 1987. 
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reil's 'Tagesschau.'17 Last but not least: Carrell was threatened18 and received police protec-
tion from the German government. That, so it has become more and more manifest in 
the past decades, proved to be something new and extremely unsettling: A German citizen, 
being threatened on German soil, by a foreign dictator. 
THE FoLLow UP IN THE NETHERLANDs 
As might be expected, the Dutch took great interest in the (until then) German Carrell 
Affair, and the broadcasting corporation V ARA wanted to show in its program 'Behind 
the News' (Achter het Nieuws) the fourteen-second clip that had caused all the commotion. 
This is the ABC of journalism, is it not? Let people decide for themselves what they think 
about the fourteen-second spoof that had caused so much uproar in a neighboring country, 
the journalists ofVARA must have thought. 
It was announced that the footage would air on 23 February 1987, eight days after the 
German broadcast, but something unusual happened: The Dutch minister of foreign affairs, 
Hans van den Broek (b. 1936), personally called the broadcasting corporation. During his 
telephone call on 23 February, a few seconds before the network was due to broadcast the 
program containing the contested item, the minister tried to convince the host, Paul Wit-
teman (b. 1946), not to air the item discussed. It would be 'too dangerous' for Dutch 
nationals living in Iran. The reporter, understandably surprised to have the minister of 
foreign affairs on the phone, took an unusual approach to this dilemma: He invited the 
minister to call again a few minutes later, when the show was live, and explain his reasons 
for asking the program to censor the spoo£ To the surprise of many, perhaps, the minister 
agreed, and as a result, all of the considerations about giving in to pressure from Iran (or 
not) were aired openly on Dutch television. Delicate discussions on what to do when faced 
with such tricky dilemmas, usually held behind closed doors, were now laid out for all to 
see. With the wisdom of hindsight we may ask: Was this perhaps one of the most fateful 
publicly aired dialogues of modern times? 
Why fateful? Because now, it was there for all to see: The fourteen seconds of satire 
were eventually not broadcasted on Dutch television (for that was the result of the open 
discussion) out of fear for an unclear threat from a dictator abroad. 
In Iran, a great triumph was booked on that memorable evening of23 February 1987: 
An Iranian dictator had successfully intimidated a small country in Europe, a country 
allegedly committed to the rule oflaw and democracy. But also, apparently, a country that 
17 "Iran angered by ayatollah under undies", in: The Globe and Mail, 21 February 1987. 
18 Religious fanatics threatened with attacks ("Religiose Fanatiker drohten mit anschliigen"). See: "Grosstes 
Witz-Archiv Deutschlands- Aufgewiirmte Slips", in: Der Spiegel, 27 October 1997. 
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was quick to relinquish all that when confronted with a much stronger antithetical perspec-
tive: The theocracy, led by God's one and only representative on earth. 
DUTCH PARLIAMENTARIANS STRUGGLING WITH THE ISSUE 
On 26 February, 1987, the minister of foreign affairs, a member of the Lubbers II coalition, 
comprised of the liberal party and the Christian Democrats, justified the steps he had taken 
before the Dutch Parliament.19 During that session, the minister of foreign affairs repeated 
what he had said during the conversation with Witteman, and claimed that he had only 
pointed out to the broadcasting corporation what the 'consequences' of the transmission 
of the program could have been. He explained that he had learned from the Dutch embassy 
in Tehran that re-airing the clip on Dutch television would be experienced in Iran as a 
'profound insult to Khomeini.' 20 This could cause an outburst of'anger' from the 'Iranian 
public.' The security of the people working at the embassy would not be guaranteed, and 
diplomatic relations could be severed (this is the worst thing that could happen to a 
country from the perspective of a diplomat, one may surmise). These considerations, V an 
den Broek explained, persuaded him to 'seek contact' with the broadcasting corporation. 
The minister further claimed that he had left the decision, and the responsibility for it, up 
to the corporation (apparently implying that, from his perspective, the broadcaster would 
be responsible for any consequences, rather than the ministry of foreign affairs or the Ira-
nian government). The Dutch minister even declared that he had not experienced any 
'pressure from the Iranian side.' All things considered, he said he 'could understand' the 
position of the Iranian government.21 
The Dutch Parliament did not strongly criticize the minister for his telephone call to 
the Dutch broadcasting corporation. The Lab or faction declared 'understanding' for what 
the minister had done.22 The Christian Democrat representative stated that 'an insignificant 
piece of satire should not affect the relationship between two countries. m The Liberal 
Bolkestein (from the VVD, so in the coalition with the Christian-Democrats at that time) 
also backed the minister of foreign affairs, reasoning that the security of Dutch people 
abroad had to be safeguarded.Z4 Yet, he confided that the whole affair made him feel 
19 Before a huge commission in which all the political fractions of the Dutch representative were present: The 
so-called commission of foreign affairs ("vaste Commissie voor Buitenlandse Zaken"). See for proceedings 
of the meeting: "Verslag van een mondeling overleg", in: Tweede Kamer, 1986-1987, 19 700, hfdst. V, nr. 
79, pp. 1-3. 
20 TK 1986-1987, p. 1. 
21 Ibid., p. 2: "Daaraan voegde hij toe dat hij de gang van zaken niet heeft ervaren als druk van lraanse zijde, 
en dat hij zich, de situatie daar in ogenschouw nemende, dehoudingvan de Iraanse regeringkon indenken". 
22 Ter Beck (PvdA), in: TK 1986-1987, p. 2. 
23 Gualtherie van Weezel (CDA), in: TK 1986-1987, p. 2. 
24 Bolkestein (VVD), in: TK 1986-1987, p. 2. 
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somewhat uneasy. He feared that this affair could set a 'dangerous precedent.'25 The only 
Member of Parliament who seemed to adopt a straightforward critical stance on the 
minister's intervention was from the socialist faction. She claimed that there was certainly 
pressure from the Iranian side, and warned that a threat of outbursts from the Iranian 
people had to be seen as 'blackmail.'26 
The Carrell Affair was soon forgotten. In the history of Dutch media it was even con-
sidered to be a funny event. The suggestion given by the journalist, Witteman, for the 
minister to call in to openly 'discuss' the moral quandary before a television audience was 
even seen as a good joke. He had brought a member of the government to discuss what to 
do with freedom of the press in a kind of popular plebiscite. Was this not the epitome of 
democracy? Or had, with the non-transmission of the program something more serious 
happened in the world? 
27 
THE RusHDIE AFFAIR 
Was the Carrell Affair indeed a 'dangerous precedent' as Bolkestein feared (without 
drawing the necessary conclusions from his, in itself, interesting intuition)? 
In 1989, two years after the Carrell Affair which ended so gloriously for the Iranian 
dictator, Khomeini tried to take a further step. This time not to intimidate a Dutch -German 
show master, but to have an ex-Muslim murdered who had written a blasphemous novel 
about the prophet of Islam. He declared: 
'I inform all zealous Muslims of the world that the author of the book entitled 
The Satanic Verses - which has been compiled, printed, and published in 
opposition to Islam, the Prophet, and the Koran -and all those involved in the 
publication who were aware of its contents, are sentenced to death. 
I call upon all zealous Muslims to execute them quickly, wherever they may be 
found, so that no one else will dare to insult the Muslim sanctities. God willing, 
whoever is killed on this path is a martyr. 
25 In 2008, so more than twenty years later, Hans van den Broelc, now a "minister of state" (an honorary title 
conferred upon ex-politicians on the basis of great merit), called upon the government to sue Geert Wilders 
for making the anti-Islam film Fitna. Again, the ex-minister of foreign affairs feared that Dutch citizens livin~ 
abroad would be harmed as a reaction to Wilders' film. See: Koele, Theo, "Kabinet moet Fitna verbieden"", 
in: De Volkskrant, 26 March 2008. So over the years Van den Broek's position on these matters has beeh 
fairly consistent. 
26 VanEs (PSP), in: TK 1986-1987, p. 3. 
2 7 The discussion of the Rushdie Affair in the next sections relies in part on: Cliteur, PauL "Van Rushdie tot 
)ones: over geweld en uitingsvrijheid", in: Afshin Ellian, Gelijn Molier en Tom Zwart. Eds., Magik ditzeggen? 
Beschouwingen over de vrijheid van meningsuiting, Boom Juridische uitgevers, The Hague 2011, pp. 67-89~ 
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In addition, anyone who has access to the author of this book but does not 
possess the power to execute him should report him to the people so that he 
may be punished for his actions.'28 
Writing and publishing a novel 'in opposition to Islam, the Prophet, and the Koran' is 
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as issued by the United Nations in 
1948, an elementary human right. Article 18 declares: 
'Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either 
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.' 
But for the faithful this Article is far more controversial than many liberals realize. 
Rush die had 'changed' his religion! He had become an 'apostate,' as is the right of everyone 
living under a regime of human rights.29 This was not the case in Iran, however.30 
But there is a second remarkable element in this declaration (a fatwa) by Ayatollah 
Khomeini. Here, a comparison with Galileo might be illuminating. In the year 1632, Galileo 
published a book of dialogues on the Copernican and Ptolemaic systems, in which, in the 
words ofBertrand Russell, 'he had the temerity to place some remarks that had been made 
by the Pope into the mouth of a character named Simplicius.'31 The pope was furious. 
Galileo was living in Florence at that time and was on good terms with the Grand Duke. 
But the Inquisition sent for him to come to Rome to be tried. The Grand Duke would be 
threatened if he would continue to shelter Galileo. Galileo however, did not make it easy 
for them; he claimed he was too old (seventy years) to travel. Besides, he was ill and going 
blind. But the Inquisition was not so easy to shake off, as one might expect (they had more 
28 Ruhollah al-Musavi al-Khomeini, 14 February 1989, quoted in: Pipes, Daniel, "Two Decades of the Rushdie 
Rules", in: Commentary, October 2010, pp. 30-35; Pipes, Daniel, The Rushdie Affair: The Novel, the Ayatollah, 
and the West, Second Edition witb a postscript by Koenraad Elst, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick 
(USA) and London (UK) 2003, p. 27. Ayatollah Khomeini "knew no English and had apparently never read 
the novef', writes Bernard Lewis in: "Religion and Murder in the Middle East", p. 105. 
29 See on this, Jespersen, Karen, & RalfPittelkow, Islamisten en natvisten: een aanklacht. With an introduction 
provided by Afshin Ellian, Nieuw Amsterdam, Amsterdam 2007, a book translated into French (Jespersen, 
Karen, & Ralf Pittelkow, Islamistes et naivistes: un acte d'accusation, Editions du Panama, Paris 2007), but 
unfortunately not into English. An impressive recent book is: Marshal!, Pau~ and Shea, Nina, Silenced: How 
Apostasy and Blasphemy Codes are Choking Freedom Worldwide, Oxford Universiry Press, Oxford 2011. 
30 And also not the situation in other parts of the world where religious extremism gains significance. See: 
Freedom ofThought2012. A Global Report on Discrimination against Humanists, Atheists and the Nonreligious, 
International Humanist and Ethical Union, London 2012; Freedom of Thought 2013. A Global Report on 
Discrimination against Humanists, Atheists and the Nonreligious, In~emational Humanist and Ethical Union, 
London 2013. 
31 Russell, Bertrand, The Scientific Outlook, Routledge, London and New York 2001 (1931), p. 12. 
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uncooperative candidates at stake to deal with)32 and Galileo was commanded to come to 
'i 
Rome as soon as he would recover, which he did, in due course, and where he, as we all 
know, recanted. 
Now, Khomeini was no pope. And Rushdie was in another situation than Galileo. 
Rushdie's 'Grand Duke,' Margaret Thatcher, would not have delivered her heretic, blas-
phemer or apostate to the supreme leader of Islam, as one may expect.33 But Khomeini 
was a much too resourceful man to acquiesce in this predicament. So he took recourse to 
the same tremendously successful instrument he had tried with so much success with the 
Dutch: Intimidation. 
In the case of the Dutch, only the possibility that violence might occur was sufficient 
for the Dutch government, and the Dutch broadcasting corporation, to back down on 
freedom of the press. In case of the arrogant British (a former world power, after all) a 
somewhat stronger medicine might be needed. This was the fatwa. As Mohamed Arshad 
Ahmedi writes in his Rushdie: Haunted by His Unholy Ghosts (1997), since that moment 
'even non-Muslims around the world were going to add a new word to their vocabularies 
no matter what language they spoke - this word was Fatwa.'34 Khomeini, in the words of 
his declaration, 'called upon all zealous Muslims to execute them quickly.' Two years later, 
in 1991, the Japanese translator ofRushdie's The Satanic Verses was found slain at a uni-
versity in northeast Tokyo.35 The translator, Hitoshi Igarashi (1947-1991), was also a 
Japanese scholar of Arabic and Persian literature. The assailant, who was never caught, 
was probably executing the orders of the religious scholar, whose reputation the Iranian 
government took great pains to defend: Ayatollah Khomeini. Such killings evince not only 
an enormous religious zeal (something Khomeini refers to in his declaration: He exhorts 
'all zealous Muslims' to execute, what Hitchens has called his 'bribed assassination 
scheme')36 but also an overwhelming respect for the interpretations of religion by religious 
leaders. From a modernist perspective, the interpretation of Holy Scripture by a religious 
scholar is not taken as the final word for religious believers. In that sense, we are 'all 
32 In 1632 Galileo had, of course, what happened with Giordano Brnno fresh in his mind: Bruno was caught 
and burned at the stake at the Campo dei Fiori in Rome in 1600. 
33 Although she may have been tempted. In his conversation with Rushdie, the French philosopher Bernard· 
Henri Levy indicated that he had heard Margaret Thatcher saying that Rushdie deserved this, and also that 
Prince Charles was chuckling in Paris about the Rushdie Affair, saying that Rushdie was quite expensive for 
the British crown. See: Levy, Bernard-Hemi, Avec Salman Rushdie: Questions de principe six, Le Livre_de 
Poche, Librairie Generale Franc;aise, Paris 1999, pp. 78 and 96. That Prince Charles is also rather expensive 
for the British crown without having any significant talent for anything at all probably did not cross his 
mind. 
34 Arshad Ahmedi, Mohamed, Rushdie: Haunted by His Unholy Ghosts, Islam International Publications 
Limited, Tilford UK 2007 (1997), p. 39. 
35 Weisman. Steven R., "Japanese Translator ofRushdie Book Found Slain", in: The New York Times, 13 July_ 
1991. 
36 Hitch ens, Christopher, God is not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything, Twelve, New York, Boston 2007, 
p.28. 
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protestants now; even Catholics are.' From a pre-modern perspective, though, which now 
makes its resurgence in theoterrorism, following the religious leaders is an absolute com-
mand, indispensable for personal salvation. 
There is one aspect that many missed in Khomeini's declaration and, in a certain sense, 
this proved also fateful to the Dutchman Theo van Gogh in 2004. Khomeini, referring to 
the book The Satanic Verses, did not only incite the murder of the author of the book, 
Salrnan Rushdie, but also called for the death of 'all those involved in the publication who 
were aware of its contents.' Italian translator Ettore Capriolo was attacked with a knife on 
3 fuly 1991 in Milan, and the Norwegian publisher William Nygaard was wounded by gun 
shots on 11 October 1993 in Oslo. As Ramine Kamrane writes on the publisher and 
translator: 'They were no Muslims.'37 Only Rushdie was Muslim, or at least regarded as 
one. 
THE MuRDER oF THEO VAN GoGH 
This was something that Theo van Gogh must have missed, when he decided to work 
together with Ayaan Hirsi Ali on the fllm Submission in 2004, a movie dedicated to the 
plight of women in countries where Islam occupies an important influence. V an Gogh 
considered himself to be the 'village idiot' of Amsterdam. He was no apostate. He had 
never been a believer. He was not a Muslim; he was an atheist. So the whole repertoire of 
punishments religions fanatics have in store for apostates, heretics and blasphemers (so 
faithfully executed by the Christian state on behalf of the Inqnisition)38 would not be 
applicable to him. 
The murder of the Dutch film director, fllm producer, columnist, author, actor, jour-
nalist, public intellectual and- most important of all- 'contrarian' Theo van Gogh ( 1957-
2004),39 abruptly ended the dream of a multicultural paradise that the Netherlands was in 
the eyes of many progressive and well-meaning leftist intellectuals and politicians. 
V an Gogh was born in The Hague, the Netherlands, but lived in Amsterdam, the cap-
ital of the country. He was also killed in Amsterdam, on the streets, in broad daylight. He 
was the son of Tohan van Gogh (b. 1922), who had worked for the Dutch intelligence 
agency. Theo's uncle (1920-1945), also called Theo, was executed as a resistance fighter 
by the Nazis during the occupation of the Netherlands in the Second World War. His 
37 Kamrane, Ramine, La Fatwa contre Rushdie: une interpretation strategique, Editions Kime, Paris 1997, p. 30. 
38 Bennassar, Bartolome, Breve Histoire de l'Inquisition: L 'intolerance au service du pouvoir, Fragile, Gavaudun 
1999; Green, Toby, Inquisition: The Reign of Fear, Macmillan, London 2007. 
39 The word 'contrarian' is deliberately chosen because, although a category in itself, the closest analogy to Van 
Gogh would perhaps be the British-American public intellectual Christopher Hitchens: See his: Hitchens, 
Christopher, Letters to a Young Contrarian, Basic Books, New York 2005. 
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great -grandfather, also called Theo, was the famous art dealer ( 1857-1891 ), younger brother 
of the world-renowned artist Vincent van Gogh (1853-1891) . 
. Theo van Gogh' s life was full of personal quarrels and vehement intellectual clashes 
with people he deemed to be politically correct (in particular the mayor of Amsterdam, 
Job Cohen). In the last years of his life he was much impressed by the ideas and work of 
two other notorious Dutch opinion makers: Pim Fortuyn (1948-2002) and Ayaan Hirsi 
Ali (b. 1969). Fortuyn was a Dutch politician who was murdered by a left-wing activist, 
Volkertvan der Graaf(b. 1969). Van der Graafdeemed Fortuyn to be a 'danger' who had 
to be stopped (i.e. eliminated). One ofFortuyn's political issues was criticizing Islam for 
its anti-Enlightenment stances, in particular with regard to homosexuality (Fortuyn was 
an ostentatious homosexual himself who openly avowed his sexual preferences). His most 
controversial statements were about the 'backward nature' ofislam (in Dutch: achterlijk).4f! 
Hirsi Ali is a Somalia-born writer who, after becoming an atheist!1 criticized her former 
religion, Islam, of anti-feminist proclivities.'2 She made a film together with V an Gogh on 
this issue, which on 29 August, 2004, was shown on Dutch television.43 The title of the 
film, Submission, refers to the literal translation of the word 'Islam,' but also to the submis-
sive attitude the believers exemplify with regard to the central ideas of their belief, which 
makes progress difficult, if not impossible. For V an Gogh, Hirsi Ali and Fortuyn, progress 
in the sense of Enlightenment was only possible by relinquishing religion.44 
40 Poorthuis, Frank and Hans Wansink, "De islam is een achterlijke cultuur", Interview with Pim Fortuyn, in: 
de Volkskrant; 9 February 2002. Fortuyn's ideas on Islam are explained in: Fortuyn, Pim, "Tegen de 
islamisering van onze cultuur. Nederlandse identiteit als fundament", in: De grate Pim Fortuyn omnibus, 
Speakers Academy, Van Gennep 2001, pp. 197-283. Fortuyn was influenced by: Goodwin, )an, Price of 
Honor: Muslim Women lift the Veil of Silence on the Islamic World, A Plume Book, Penguin 2003 (1995). 
See on his life and ideas in general: Snel, Bert, Pi m 1: De politieke biografie van Pi m Fartuyn als socioloog en 
als politicus 1990-2002, Uitgeverij Van Praag, Amsterdam 2012; Snel, Bert, Pi m 2: Pim Fortuyn en zijn par· 
tijen, Leefbaar Nederland, Leefbaar Rotterdam, Lijst Pim Fortuyn, Prof. Dr. W.P.S. Fortuyn Stichting 2013. 
41 She tells her life-story in two autobiographical books: Hirsi Ali, Ayaan, Infidek My Life, The Free Press, 
London 2007 and Hirsi Ali, Ayaan, Nomad: From Islam to America, A Personal Journey through the Clash 
of Civilizations, The Free Press, London 2010. 
42 She made her entree in Dutch intellectual circles in 2001 with an article uuder the title" Allow us a Voltaire". 
She means: allow us, Muslims, also critical minds as Voltaire. Do not condemn us, Muslims, to obscurity 
by criticizing the Enlightenment thinkers who criticize religion. See: HirsiAli, Ayaan, "Gun ons een Voltaire", 
in: Trouw, 24 November 2001, also in: Vink, )affe and Chris Rutenfrans, De terugkeer van de geschiedenis, 
Uitgeverij Augustus, Amsterdam 2005, pp. 79-85. She further developed her criticism in: Hirsi Ali, Ayaan, 
The Caged Virgin: An Emancipation Proclamation for Women and Islam, The Free Press, New York and 
Sydney 2006. Her work shows some similarities with that ofTaslima Nasrin (France), Necla Kelek (Germany), 
Maryam Namazi (United Kingdom). See: Cliteur, Paul, "Female Critics oflslamism", in: Feminist Theology, 
2011, 19(2), pp. 154-167. 
43 Hirsi Ali, Ayaan, Submission, broadcasted in "Guests of the Summer" ("Zomergasten") on 29 August 2004, 
with an introduction by Betsy Udink, Uitgeverij Augustus, Amsterdam 2004. 
44 At least Islam. Fortuyu had sympathy for Catholicism. Hirsi Ali and V an Gogh were straightforward atheists 
and had no sympathy for any religion whatsoever. Hirsi All was influenced by the Dutch atheist Herm<n?: 
Philipse. See: Philipse, Herman, Verlichtingsfundamentalisme? Open brief over Verlichting en fundamen,c 
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Since the terrorist attacks of9/Yl, V an Gogh made criticism ofislam an important part 
of his polemics. His last film, titled '06/05,' was dedicated to the life and to the murder of 
Pim Fortuyn, who was killed on that date. In 2003, Van Gogh wrote a book titled Allah 
weet het beter (Allah knows Better).45 In circles of artists and writers, Van Gogh was 
exceptional because he did not subscribe to the left-wing views of many of his colleagues. 
But he was also hated for this. And for his personal attacks, which were - it has to be 
admitted - often beyond the pale.46 
The irony is that for many people his death, and especially the way this came about, 
actually proved what he had not been able to convey during his lifetime: That radical Islam 
was a mortal danger to the social cohesion of Dutch society (and, frankly, all democratic 
;!nd liberal societies). 
:1. NOVEMBER, 2004 
On 2 November, 2004, V~ Gogh was murdered by the home-grown jihadist Mohammed 
Bouyeri (b. 1978)'7 while cycling to work in the morning. After shooting the filmmaker 
eight times with a handgun, the killer tried to decapitate V an Gogh with a knife. Bouyeri 
also stabbed two knives in the chest of his victim, one with a note in which he spelled out 
his extremist message to the world, and in particular to western democracies, to Jews and 
to Ayaan Hirsi Ali. HirsiAli proved to be untouchable for the killer, while Van Gogh was 
a soft target. Van Gogh was an easy targer for two reasons. The first reason was that he 
had no police protection, like Hirsi Ali did have. Van Gogh used to make jokes about the 
Amsterdam police who had offered him protection, but only during and after his public 
performances: 'I hope that AI Qaeda respects the office hours,' V an Gogh used to say. The 
second reason is that he himself, as we indicated, believed that he was not in the same way 
a target for terrorist attacks as Hirsi Ali was, because she was a Muslim (or rather an 
apostate Muslim) and he was a Dutch writer with no ties to Islam. So in his case, there was 
no 'apostasy.'48 According to his understanding of Islamist ideology, there would be no 
talisme aan Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Mede bestemd voor Piet Rein Donner, minister van Justitie en coOrdinerend 
minister in de strijd tegen terreur, Uitgeverij Bert Bakker, Amsterdam 2005. 
45 Gogh, Theo van, Allah weet het beter, Xtra Producties, Amsterdam 2003. 
46 A portrait ofVan Gogh is painted by his friends Holman and Pam in: Holman, Theodor, Theo is dood, With 
a foreword by Gijs van de Westelaken, Mets en Schilt, Amsterdam 2006; Pam, Max, Het bijenspook: over 
dier, mens en god, Prometheus, Amsterdam 2009. 
47 Buruma, !an, Murder in Amsterdam: The Death ofTheo van Gogh and the Limits of Tolerance, Penguin, New 
York 2006; Eyerman, Ron, The Assassination of Theo van Gogh: from Social Drama to Cultural Trauma, 
Duke University Press, Dnrham and London 2008; Llosa, Mario Vargas, "SchieBen, schneiden, stoBen: Theo 
van Goghs schrecklicher Tod", Die Welt, 4 November 2006; Chorus, Jutta, & Olgnn, Ahmet, In Godsnaam: 
Het jaar van Theo van Gogh, Uitgeverij Contact, Antwerp/ Amsterdam 2005. 
48 lbn Warraq, Ed., Leaving Islam: Apostates Speak Out, Prometheus Books, Amberst, New York, 2003; Marshall, 
Paul, and Nina Shea, Silenced: How Apostasy and Blasphemy Codes are Choking Freedom Worldwide, Oxford 
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reason to harm him, let alone kill him. He was, after all, 'the village idiot.' But this proved 
to be a fatal mistake of not only V an Gogh himself, but also of the Amsterdam police and 
Dutch authorities in general. The murder took most people by surprise. Especially the 
politically correct elite that V an Gogh had so vehemently criticized. Now they felt em bar-
rassed, although not many people (frankly, no one) changed their attitudes openly. For 
Dutch society, though, the murder proved a watershed. The anti-Islam party of Geert 
Wilders had huge electoral success (like Fortuyn's party had done before).49 It is difficult 
to imagine this taking place without this 'spectacular' murder. A few weeks after the murder 
of Van Gogh, on 24 November, 2004, Wilders created a foundation aimed at publicizing 
his ideology and attracting financial support. This organization was the forerunner of the 
foundation currently named 'Friends of the PVV' (Stichting Vrienden van de PVV), which 
is, of course, closely related to Wilders' political party: the Party for Freedom (Partij voor 
de vrijheid, or PVV). 
The murderer ofV an Gogh, Mohammed Bouyeri, was apprehended almost immediately 
after his deed and was convicted on 26 July, 2005, to a life-long prison sentence without 
parole. 50 This severe sentence was in part the result of the fact that the murderer showed 
no remorse at all. On the contrary, he used the public trial to explain the jihadist ideology 
in a manner that must have been a painful experience for many people who had denied 
any danger. 
After the murder, a confusing and heated debate on the 'causes' of this tragedy erupted. 
This made evident a deep rift in Dutch society. On the one hand, there was the multicultural 
and politically correct Dutch elite who pointed accusatory fingers at V an Gogh' s brutal 
and outrageous criticism of vulnerable minorities in Dutch society. On the other hand, 
there were the people that pointed to the nature of jihadist ideology. The two groups could 
not agree on the causes of the new religious terrorism that se,emed to be taking hold. 
FROM VAN GoGH TO THE DANISH CARTOON AFFAIR 
We ended the Rudi Carrell Affair with the speculation that it is plausible to suppose that 
there is a connection between the Carrell Affair and the subsequent Rushdie Affair. It is 
not improbable that Khomeini's success on the evening of23 February, 1987, having seen 
a minister of foreign affairs on Dutch television trying to convince a Dutch journalist not 
to criticize his person and regime by re-airing a controversial spoof, has had some effect 
University Press, Oxford 2011; Marshall, Paul, Ed., Radical Islam's Rules: The Worldwide Spread of Extreme 
Shari'aLaw, Rowman & Littlefied Publishers, Inc., Lanham etc. 2005; Sookhdeo, Patrick, Freedom to Believe: 
Challenging Islam's Apostasy Law, Isaac Publishing, Three Rivers (Michigan) 2009. 
49 For a biography ofWilders, see: Fennema, Meindert, Geert Wilders: Tovenaarsleerling, Uitgeverij Bert Bakker, 
Amsterdam 2010. 
50 Rechtbank Amsterdam, 26 juli 2005 (Moord op Theo vau Gogh). 
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on the Rushdie Affair one year later. But, let's admit it, this is speculation. We do not have 
access to the Iranian state archives, nor do we have information from Khomeini himself, 
or .those around him, that the Dutch and the English cases are connected. 
The connection between the murder ofTheo van Gogh and the next great clash between 
democratic values and theoterrorism is better documented. Why were the Danish cartoons 
made? This had something to do with the V an Gogh case. Flemrning Rose (b. 1958), culture 
editor of the Jyllands Posten, the daily that published the cartoons, was surprised by the 
fact that in January 2005, the International Film Festival in Rotterdanr refused to show the 
film Submission by Theo van Gogh and Ayaan Hirsi Ali due to security considerations. 51 
The organization feared 'that the screening might trigger further acts of religious violence.'52 
Rose considered this to be odd. Would this not imply that free press gave in to threats of 
violence? Under those circumstances, was freedom of expression not in fact abolished or 
at least severely limited?53 That was Rose's question. 
Another incident that provided food for thought was that writer Kire Bluitgen (b. 1959) 
found it impossible to contract an illustrator for a children's book because nobody dared 
to make a picture of the prophet Mohammed. 54 
This was the background of the cartoon affair. This is important, because if it is true, 
there were no pestering xenophobic intellectuals trying to target innocent religious 
minorities, as was contended in many commentaries. 55 The people who organized the 
cartoon experiment were concerned. They were concerned about the erosion of civilliber-
ties. 
But it soon appeared to Rose that it proved much more difficult than expected to con-
vince people that there was something important at stake. There was no problem at all, 
many said. Subsequently, the idea arose to 'test' whether there really was a problem. A real 
empirical test, like the way science tries to prove or disprove something. 56 To test whether 
cartoonists exerted self-censorship, he asked forty-two cartoonists to give their view on 
the prophet Mohammed. Only twelve of those actually sent in a cartoon. It was not clear 
in advance who would present a critical view on the prophet and who would take a more 
51 Troost, Nanda, "Nooit zalikzwijgen", io: de Volkskrant, 9 January 2010, www.voikskrant.nl/vklnl/2694/Tech-
Media/archief/article/detail/977464/2010/0l/09/Nooit-zal-ik-zwijgen.dhtml 
52 "Fears prqmpt withdrawal of Van Gogh ffim", in: The Guardian, 27 January 2005, www.the-
guardian.com/ftlm/2005/jan/27 /festivals.rotterdamffimfestival. 
53 Rose, Hemming, "Why I Published Those Cartoons", in: Washingtonpost.com, Sunday, 19 February 2006. 
54 Kim, Sebastian C.H., "Freedom or Respect: Public Theology and the Debate over the Danish Cartoons", in: 
International Journal of Public Theology, 1 (2007), pp. 249-269. 
55 For example, one of the princesses of Orange, MabeL stated in an interview that one should not publish 
something with the sole aim to insult, harm or humiliate other people. See the remarks by Princess Mabel 
quoted in: Albresht, Y oeri, and Pieter Broertjes, "Ik kan niet tegen onrecht Het veelkoppige monster van 
de onvrije democratie", in: de Volkskrant, 10 March 2007. 
56 See on the scientific method: Russell, Bertrand, Religion and Science, Oxford University Press, London New 
York Toronto 1935,pp. 7-19. 
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laudatory stance. The experiment was simply to establish how many people, if any, would 
dare to make such a cartoon. And so the twelve cartoons that would cause such turmoil 
on the international scene came into being: the cartoons 'that shook the world,' to quote 
the title of Jytte Klausen' s book. 57 
THE BRITISH, THE DANISH, THE DuTCH, AND THE AMERICANS 
So far we have dealt with the Dutch, the British and the Danish confrontation with 
theoterrorism. The Dutch were the first to be tested. And they failed. The British were the 
second. They fared a little better, perhaps also because of the indefatigable Rush die himself, 
who showed great talent in mobilizing the artistic scene to support his case.58 Rushdie also 
had great talent in making clear that this was not about himself or about one book, but 
about books in general, about what is called the 'principle of free speech.'59 His case gave 
rise to some of history's most beautiful defenses of freedom of speech and freedom in 
general, including Jeremy Waldron's early commentary,60 and an essay by the always 
thoughtful Karel van het Reve. 61 These were the 'Milton's' of our time. 62 
Now it was America's turn to be tested by the religious fanatics. Let us first state what 
we do not mean by being 'tested' in this context. First, the United States had, of course, 
9/11. This was indeed a manifestation of religious fanaticism of the most violent sort. But 
it was not a 'test' in the sense that it is discussed in this contribution. A 'test' in the sense 
discussed here means that there is a dilemma with regard to the question: What action 
should we undertake? Give up on your principles in exchange for temporary peace, or 
defend fundamental ideas: Freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, 
et cetera? The Cartoon Affair was a real dilemma for the Danish politicians. What to do? 
57 Klausen, Jytte, The Cartoons that Shook the World. Yale University Press. New Haven and London 2009. 
58 A collection of support from fellow writers is: MacDonogh, Steve, Ed., In Association with Article I9, The 
Rushdie Letters: Freedom to Speak, Freedom to Write, Brandon Book Publishers, Kerry, Ireland 1993; Chervel, 
Thierry, Hrsg., Redefreiheit ist dns Leben: Briefe an Salmon Rushdie, Piper, Miincben, Ziiricb 1992. French 
support for Rushdie is to be found in: Abdallah, Anouar, et al., Pour Rushdie: Cent intellectuels arabes et 
musulmans pour la liberte d'expression, La Decouverte, Carrefour des litteratures, Colibri, Paris 1993. 
59 Rushdie, Salman, "Coming After Us", in: Lisa Appiguanesi, Ed., Free Expression is No Offence, Penguin 
Books, London 2005, pp. 21-29; Rushdie, Salman, "Do we have to fight the battle for the Enlightenment all 
over again?", in: The Independent, 22 January 2005; Rushdie, Salman, "In Good Faith", 1990, in: Salman 
Rushdie, Imaginary Homelands: Essays and Criticism 1981-1991, Vintage Books, London 2010 (1991), 
pp. 393-414; Rush die, Salman, Joseph Anton: A Memoir, Jonathau Cape, London 2012. 
60 Waldron, Jeremy, "Rush die and Religion", first published under the title "Too important for Tact" in: The 
Times Literary Supplement, 10 March 1989, pp. 248 and 260, aud reprinted in: Waldron, Jeremy, Liberal 
Rights: Collected Papers 1981-1991, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York 1993, pp. 134-143. 
61 Reve, Karel van het, "Achterlijke artikelen", in: Elsevier, 4 March 1989, also included in: Karel vauhet Reve, 
Verzameld Werk, Vol. 6, Van Oorschot, Amsterdam 2011, pp. 350-353. 
62 Milton, John, Areopagitica, 1644, in: John Milton, Complete Poems and major Prose, Edited with notes and 
introduction by Merritt Y. Hughes, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis 2003 (1957). 
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Grovel for the fanatics and make excuses about cartoons in newspapers? Try to have the 
cartoons suppressed, and the makers convicted on some trumped up case about 'blasphemy,' 
'insulting a group of people because of their religion' or similar legislation? The Dutch 
were put to the test in a similar fushion: What to do? Broadcast fourteen seconds of 
(un)necessary satire on a brutal dictator, or try to pass on this dilemma to others (as the 
Dutch did de facto with the British, who would become the next victim of the zealous 
fanatics Khomeini had ignited). 9/11 was not a situation of that sort. And neither was the 
Iran hostage crisis of 1979-1981. Here, Iran seized sixty-six American citizens at the U.S. 
embassy in Tehran, holding fifty-two of them for more than a year. The crisis, which took 
place during the chaotic aftermath oflran's Islamic revolution (1978-1979) and its over-
throw of the Pahlavi monarchy, had a dramatic effect on the domestic politics in the United 
States, it poisoned US-Iran relations for decades, and proved a deadly blow to the popularity 
of the Carter administration. But in the hostage crisis, the free speech dilemma was not 
present. It is only recently that the Americans have made their entrance into the brave 
new world where freedom of speech or the First Amendment is the target. This happened 
in the Terry Jones Affair and the Youssef Affair. 
63 
THE TERRY }ONES AFFAIR 
The controversy surrounding Jones started in July 2010, when he used Facebook to 
announce an 'International Burn a Quran Day,' to be held at his church on 11 September, 
2010, in honor of the victims of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New 
York, exactly nine years before. 64 Jones' idea was eccentric, but not entirely new. On 
14 January, 1989, in the town of Bradford, in northern Eng}and, another book-burning 
was organized: Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses. As Kenan Malik (b. 1960) writes in 
From Fatwa to ]ihad: The Rushdie Affair and its Legacy (2009), the novel was tied to a stake 
before being set alight in front of the police station. 'It was an act calculated to shock and 
offend,' Malik writes.65 And it did more than that: 'The burning book became an icon of 
the rage oflslam.'66 After Terry Jones had announced his plans, assistant pastor Wayne 
Sapp up loaded a video to Y ouTube in which the church's intentions were explained, and 
63 The material on Terry Jones in the following sections is in part a translation of an article that appeared (in 
Dutch) in the Nederlands furistenblad, the abovementioned: Rijpkema, Bastiaan, "Vrijheid van meningsuiting 
in de val tussen religieus extremisme en utilitarisme", no. 44/45, 2012, p. 3106-3111. 
64 "Florida Church Plans Koran Burning on 9111 anniversary". Agence France Presse, 31 July 312010; see also: 
"Who is Terry )ones? Pastor behind 'Burn a Koran-day", 7 September 2010, ABC News, http:/labc-
news.go.com/US/terry-jones-pastor -burn-koran -day lstory?id~ 11575665# .UHCaKs20L94. 
65 Malik, Kenan, From Fatwa to Jihad: The Rushdie Affair and Its Legacy, Atlantic Books, London 2009, p. ix.; 
Thomas, Domitiique, Le Londonistan: Le djihad au Coeur de !'Europe, Editions Michalon 2005, p. 34. 
66 Malik, Ibid., p. ix.; Weller, Paul, A Mirror for our Times: "The Rushdie Affair" and the Future of Multicultur-
alism, Continuum, London, New York 2009, p. 2. 
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- to add force to the announcement - included some images of a burning Quran. 67 On 
21 July, the Religious News Service re-aired the announcement,68 and in the following days 
the news spread to, among others, England," the Netherlands70 and France.71 A few days 
later, on 31 July, the first terrorist threat was made; members of the 'Al Falluja Jibadist 
Forum' threatened to 'spill rivers of your (American) blood.'72 
So, when the leader of a small church of about fifty members73 in a - by American 
standards - fairly small town like Gainesville74 announced that he intended to burn a 
Quran, this announcement apparently reached the Netherlands (in this case the, in terms 
of readership, rather insignificant newspaper, Reformatorisch Dagblad) within the same 
month.75 Modern means of communication make the world more closely knit. Marshall 
McLuhan (1911-1980) described this phenomenon as early as 1962 and coined the now 
well-known notion of the 'Global Village.'76 Unfortunately, in times of ongoing terrorist 
threats, we are inclined to say that our stay in the 'Global Village' is becoming increasingly 
less pleasant than the idea of a 'village' might suggest. The reality of our time is that what 
happens in one country is most likely to have effects in other countries. 77 Contemporary 
terrorism is transnational by its nature and recognizes no international boundaries. This 
'new reality' was confirmed once again in the Terry Jones affair. 
In September 2010, the media attention started to gather momentum and the responses 
to Jones' plans also intensified. After protests broke out in Indonesia78 and Afghanistan/9 
67 "Why couldn't we look away?", St. Petersburg Times, 11 September 2010. 
68 Ibid. 
69 "Church will burn Koran on 9-11", The Guardian, 27 July 2010. 
70 "Kerk roept op tot Koranverbrauding", Reformatorisch Dagblad, 28 July 2010. 
71 "Une eglise de Floride propose de brulerle Coran le 11 septembre", Agence France Presse, 31 july2010. 
72 "Florida Church Plans Korao Burning on 9/11 anniversary", Agence France Presse, 31 July 2010. 
73 Estimations vary. According to the local newspaper The Gainesville Sun the church has 50 members, see: 
"Petraeus: Dove World's Quran burning may have global impact", The Gainesville Sun, 7 September 2010, 
www.gainesville.com/article/20 100907/ ARTICLES/100909663. 
74 Gainesville has approximately 125.326 inhabitaots (2011), see: http:l/quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12/1225 
175.html 
75 "Kerk roept op tot Koranverbranding", 28 juli 2010, Reformatorisch Dagblad, www.refdag.nl/kerk-
plein/kerkuieuws/kerk_ vs_roept_ op_tot_koranverbranding_1_ 493456. 
7 6 See McLuhan, M., The Gutenberg Galaxy: the making of typographic man, Toronto: The University ofT oronto 
Press, 1962, inter alia, p. 21 and 31. Globalization as such, of course, began much earlier. See e.g. Roberts, 
).M., The Penguin History of Europe, London: Penguin Books 1996, p. 340-341. 
77 See Cliteur, P.B., Het Monotheistisch Dilemma, Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers 2010, p. 78 and also Singer, 
P., One World: The Ethics of Globalization, New Haven & London: Yale University Press 2004, p. 7. 
78 «Protest rallies against «Burn a Quran day" continue", Asia-Pacific News Agencies, 5 September 2010. 
79 "Afghans attack NATO outpost; Muslims worldwide outraged at threat to burn Quran", Montreal Gazette; 
10 September 2010. 
306 
15 THE NEW CENSORSHIP 
ffi 'al fr c • th J d so p ki 81 82 d I ., al gov;ernment o cr s am, among o ers, or an, a stan, Egypt, an raq so 
condemned the proposed burning.84 Iran blamed Israel.85 
WHAT To Do: DEFEND FREE SPEECH OR GIVE IN TO TERRORISM? 
The same type of reaction that in 1987, in the aftermath of the German Rudi Carrell Affair, 
was presented by the Dutch minister of foreign affairs in the discussion before the Dutch 
television audience, was now ventilated by a man with high military rank: U.S. General 
D.avid Petraeus (b. 1952), at thattime the ISAF commander in Afghanistan. He condemned 
tb.e proposed burning of the holy book, and warned of possible consequences. This is what 
he said: 
'It could endanger troops and it could endanger the overall effort. It is precisely 
the kind of action the Taliban uses and could cause significant problems. Not 
just here, but everywhere in the world we are engaged with the Islamic commu-
'ty >86 m . 
Following Petraeus, the burning was condemned by a diverse parade of celebrities and 
government officials, from actress Angelina Jolie (b. 1975)87 and the 'Veterans of Foreign 
Wars of the United States,'88 to the U.S. embassy in Kabul,"9 the lieutenant General of the 
UN-training mission in Afghanistan William Caldwell (b. 1954), 90 Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton (b. 1947),91 and NATO Secretary General Rasmussen (b. 1953).92 
Pastor Jones, however, indicated he wanted to have a reaction from the White House. 
The president seemed reluctant, though, to make official declarations on the issue. And 
80 "Jordan condemns US pastor's planned Koran burning", The Jordan Times, IQ September 2010. 
81 "Worldwide outrage at planned Quran burning", AlArabiya, 8 September 2010. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 For an overview of countries that condemned the burning, see: www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-
lssues/20 I 0/0909/11-conotries-speaking -out -against-Koran-burning-in-Florida/India. 
85 According to Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki the burning was "orchestrated by the Zionist 
regime after being defeated in its efforts against Muslims and the Islamic world", see: "Worldwide outrage 
at planned Quran burning", AI Arabiya, 8 September 2010. 
86 "Petraeus Says Quran-Burning Protest Will Endanger Troops", Wall Street Journa~ 6 September 2010. 
87 "Angelina Jolie", The Hamilton Spectator, 10 September 2010, www.thespec.com/whatson/article/254810--
angelina-jolie. 
88 "VWF Strongly Against "Burn a Koran Day"", Targeted News Service, 7 September 2010. 
89 "Petraeus: Koran burning plan will endanger US troops", BBC South Asia, www.bbc.eo.uk/news/world-
south-asia-11209738. 
90 "U.S. Afghanistan commanders condemn Koran-burning plan", Reuters, 6 September 2010. 
91 "Clinton condemns Quran-burning plan", CNN U.S., 8 September 2010. 
92 "Pressure mounts in U.S. against Koran-burning plan", Reuters, 7 September 2010. 
307 
PAuL CLITEUR, ToM HERRENBERG AND BASTIAAN RIJPKEMA 
how could he? Part of the First Amendment, which protects free speech, is that it is up to 
the American citizen to choose his own, sometimes unsympathetic, means to get his 
message across. Book burning, although an archaic approach, used to be practiced widely93 
not only in Greek and Roman culture(4 but also in Christian Europe. It received a bad 
press because of the Nazis, whose book burning, initiated by Joseph Goebbels, was still 
fresh in our minds. But can you forbid this? There were certainly no legal grounds to do 
so. Besides, how could this be seen as the task of the president? In the American democracy, 
with the separation of powers, establishing the limits of free speech and developing criteria 
as to which means are legitimate for expressing your opinion, is the prerogative of the 
legislative or the judiciary, but certainly not the executive!5 What the theoterrorist aims 
to do (and if not 'aims to do,' he certainly effectuates this) is forcing the executive to 
transgress its bounds. Again, this can be seen as a success. If a foreign dictator can make 
a democratically legitimated politician in another country seek refuge in an attempt to 
stifle the press, this can be seen as a triumph of dictatorship over democracy. If the president 
of the greatest democracy in the world is forced to call an American citizen to ask him not 
to use his constitutional right attributed to him in the national constitution, this is not 
only a triumph of dictatorship, but also a humiliation of democracy with great symbolic 
significance. The president and his advisors must have been aware of the delicacy of the 
situation. But, apparently, the president feared the turmoil and looming catastrophe even 
more than a violation of the constitution. First, a White House spokesman declared that 
the White House subscribed to Petraeus' warning!6 (Again, a breach of the normal situation: 
A president who agrees with a civil servant). Then things accelerated. Two days after the 
White House statement, U.S. President Obama (b. 1961) appeared on 'Good Morning 
America,' where he explicitly called on Jones to refrain from the Quran burning. The 
President said the following: 
'What he's proposing to do is completely contrary to our values as Americans; 
that this country has been built on the notions of religious freedom and religious 
tolerance. And as a very practical matter, as commander -in-chief of the armed 
forces of the United States, I just want him to understand that this stunt that 
he is talking about pulling could greatly endanger our young men and women 
in uniform who are in Iraq, who are in Mghanistan. We're already seeing 
protests against Americans just by the mere threat that he is making.' 
93 Fish burn, Matthew, Burning Books, Palgrave, MacMillan 2008. 
94 Cramer, Frederick H., "Bookhurning and Censorship in Ancient Rome: A Chapter from the History ofldeas 
of Speech", in: Journal of the History of Ideas, VoL 6, No. 2 (Apr., 1945), pp. 157-196. 
95 One could question how 'involved' judges should be in the lawmalcing process, see for instance: Rijpkema, 
Bastiaan, 'Rechterlijke toetsing is een bijzonder slecht idee', in: de Volkskrant, 18 February 2014. 
96 "Quran burning plan a "concern": White House", CBC News, 8 September 2010. 
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And, when asked what he was ~orried about, Obama replied: 'Well, look, this is a 
recruitment bonanza for al-Qaida'97 
That same day Jones declared- despite the pressure from the White House -that he 
was still determined to bum a Quran on 11 September.98 A few hours after Obama's 
appearance on 'Good Morning America,' Jones received a direct phone call from U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (b. 1943). Can you, as a largely unknown maverick 
pastor, force one of the most senior government officials to negotiate with you about what 
you will do and say? Yes, apparently you can. During a brief conversation, Gates pointed 
to the potential dangers to American forces and urged }ones to cancel his plans99 Here, 
the Dutch minister offoreign affairs, V an den Broek, calling to the Dutch television program 
and advocating a cancellation of the fourteen seconds of criticism of Ayatollah Khomeini, 
comes to mind. 
The comparison between the American president and the American Secretary of 
Defense trying to dissuade Jones from burning a Quran, and the Dutch minister of foreign 
affairs trying to influence the media, is interesting, because there are several similarities. 
During the televised conversation in 1987 between the Dutch minister and the Dutch 
anchorman of the program, tlie journalist suggested that by not showing the Khomeini 
spoof, they, the people from the broadcasting corporation, could do some 'kind of favor' 
to the minister. V an den Broek, however, did not think Witteman was delivering him any 
service: 'I only provide the information you need in order to take your own responsibility 
in this matter.' Witteman disagreed and answered: 'But you understand, of course, because 
you are an eminent person, what kind of influence the minister of foreign affairs 
expounding such a view has. No matter how much we value our freedom of the press.' 
Perhaps the journalist should have answered: 'Excellency, with all due respect, what 
you suggest is that we change roles. Is it not my responsibility to report on what happens 
in this world and your responsibility to protect us against evil?' Wbat the minister effectively 
did was foster the impression that he, as an organ of the state, could 'inform' the broadcast-
ing corporation of the evils of the world in which we are living, and that the broadcasting 
corporation had to bear the burden of not making this world unsafe. By a majestic sleight 
of hand the minister reversed the tasks and responsibilities of the most important actors 
in this play. 
But with his remark, the journalist was also onto something. Apparently, the Ininister, 
in pretending only to 'give advice' to the broadcasting corporation, tried to make people 
believe that he acted in his private capacity: As an: ordinary civilian 'giving advice' to a 
reporter. And he expected ilie broadcasting corporation to adopt the role of the state by 
97 For a transcript of the interview, see «Opinion Roundup: Burning the Quran", National Public Radio, 
9 September 2010. 
98 "Florida Pastor Determined to Carry Out Quran Burning", AOL News, 8 September 2010. 
99 "Obama's Pentagon chief calls Florida pastor", USA Today, 10 September 2010. 
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doing what is necessary to gnarantee the security of Dutch citizens. Primarily on the territory 
of the state, but also abroad. If the state cannot bear that, indeed great, responsibility, the 
state ceases to be a state. It becomes a 'failed state.' 
Now, it may be argued that it is wildly over the top to insinuate that the United States, 
the United Kingdom, or theN etherlands are 'failed states' because they have not been able 
to avert some terrorist attacks. The Netherlands is not Somalia, is it? 
This is true. But this teasing exaggeration may perhaps sharpen our understanding. 
What constitutes a 'failed state' is difficult to ascertain. For some religious minorities living 
in Saudi Arabia, the state is failing to protect their interests and guarantee their personal 
safety.100 Christians in that country have a different opinion about the state than the 
majority of Sunni Muslims. 101 And how does the Danish state look from the perspective 
of Kurt W estergaard, living under 24/7 protection for almost ten years already? He is still 
alive, the optimist retorts, which is true, but at what personal cost for the cartoonist? And 
how do the bereaved ofTheo V an Gogh look at the Dutch state? As a monument of decency 
and effectiveness, or at least with some ambivalent feelings about its monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force? 
One may still insist that the notion of the 'failed state' is too rhetorical to use in this 
context. In that case, we are willing not to use it. As long as the general message comes 
across that there is an element of perspective in the concept of 'failed state,' this is fine. 
Let us underline: It is the state, not the broadcasting corporation, which has a respon-
sibilityto gnarantee the security of the citizens. What the state may require from its citizens 
(and from private organizations) is to behave in accordance with the law. This was, effec-
tively, what the television corporation was doing. It was, obviously, not illegal to report 
on a journalistic event in Germany. Not only was it not illegal, it was precisely what jour-
nalists are supposed to do. What the minister asked from the broadcasting corporation 
was to suspend or annul their primary function (i.e. to inform the public) because the state 
failed (or anticipated this failing) to fulfil! its primary function. When an incumbent 
minister asks a television host - during a live show- not to broadcast a specific fragment, 
this is not simply the 'supplying of information,' but a request that a presenter- especially 
'on the spot' - can hardly refuse. 
100 See Morawiec, Laurent, Princes ofDarkness: The Saudi Assault on the West, Rowman and Little:field, Lanham 
2005 for a chilling portrait. 
101 See on this: Short!, Rupert, Christianophobia: A Faith under Attack, Rider, London 2012; Marshall, Paul. 
and Nina Shea, Silenced: How Apostasy and Blasphemy Codes are Choking Freedom Worldwide., Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2011. 
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( ' 102 
TIIE MARK BAsSELEY YoussEF AFFAIR 
The second American affair that sparked a row was the Y oussef Affair. Mark Basseley 
Youssef103 is a Coptic Christian who was born in Egypt, but emigrated to the United States 
· later in his life. He is the auctor intellectualis of a short video that became known as Inno-
cence of Muslims. 104 Roughly speaking, the video consists of two parts. The first part pictures 
.an angry mob of Muslims rioting in the streets of modem-day Egypt. In the second part, 
the video shifts to the past and focuses on the prophet Mohammed. This part includes 
scenes in which Mohammed is talking to a donkey, womanizing, and advocating slavery. 
Moreover, he is called 'a murderous thug' and is, in general, pictured as a warlord. While 
this video undoubtedly offended many Muslims, it is no more offensive in nature than, 
for example, anti-Semitic stories that have appeared in Arab media about Jews demanding 
the blood of a child for their matzos, or about a Jewish conspiracy to rule the world 
~ occasionally regarding the Protocols of the Elders of Zion as the brightest star of indis-
putable science.105 Apart from this similarity, the greatest difference with those expressions 
is, obviously, that violent eruptions occurred in the wake of Innocence of Muslims. It was 
reported that 21 countries were the scene of protests or attacks on American and other 
Western targets in the first week after the video attracted serious attention.106 
Just as with the affairs discussed earlier in this chapter, several political leaders found 
it difficult to defend freedom of speech in this case. The highest official of the foremost 
international organization, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (b. 1944), 
commented that: 
'All human beings have the inalienable right to freedom of expression, freedom 
of assembly. These are very fundamental rights. But, at the same time, this 
freedom of expression should not be abused by individuals. Freedom of 
expression should be and must be guaranteed and protected, when they are 
I 02 The following discussion of the Mark Basseley Youssef Affair is based in part on: Herrenberg, Tom, "Politici, 
de vrijheid van meningsuiting en Innocence of Muslims", in: Nederlands ]uristenblad, No. 33, 27 September 
2013, pp. 2255-2259; Herrenberg, Tom, "Vrijheid van meningsuiting in de multiculturele samenleving: 
evaluatie van twee tegenstrijdige interpretaties", in: Civis Mundi, 14 January 2014. 
I 03 Also known as N akoula Basseley N akoula. 
104 Google, the parent company of video-sharing website YouTube, was ordered by the 9th U.S. Circuit Court 
of Appeals in February 2014 to remove the video from You Tube. This was due to a copyright claim by one 
of the actresses in the video. 
105 For examples of anti-Semitic expressions, see: «New Trends in Arabic Anti-semitism", vimeo.com/16779150; 
"Cartoons from the Arab World", www.tomgrossmedia.com/ArabCartoons.htm; "Egyptian Scholars: 'The 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion' Is the Constitution of Freemasonry, Whose Goal Is Jewish Domination of 
the World", www.memritv.org/clip/en/3039.htm. 
106 "Violent protests over US-made film spill into more Islamic nations", The Daily Telegraph, 18 September 
2012. Although Innocence of Muslims sparked controversy in September 2012, it was uploaded on You Tube 
two months earlier. 
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used for common justice, common purpose. When some people use this free-
dom of expression to provoke or humiliate some others' values and beliefs, 
then this cannot be protected in such a way. So my position is that freedom of 
expression, while it is a fundamental right and privilege, should not be abused 
by such people, by such a disgraceful and shameful act.'107 
What is most striking is that Ban Ki-moon's preconditions for protected speech (i.e. the 
obscure 'common justice' and 'common purpose' requirements) are completely outside 
the recognized human rights framework and cannot be found in the key human rights 
instruments adopted by Ban Ki-moon's own organization: the United Nations.108 Even if 
we would take Ban Ki-moon's requirements as mandatory for protected speech, we are 
left with the question: What would count as a 'common purpose' or as 'common justice'? 
It is everything but obvious that ridiculing symbols of power, whether they are political, 
religious, or economic in nature, fails to serve a 'common purpose,' bearing in mind that 
critique - which can, of course, take many forms - enables mankind to progress.109 Ban 
Ki-moon also referred to a specific kind of reprehensible behavior: 'Humiliation.' A person 
who humiliates 'makes someone feel ashamed and foolish by injuring their dignity and 
pride.' no When exactly is freedom of speech used 'to provoke or humiliate some others' 
values and beliefs'? Would Ban Ki-moon say that someone who strives for the legal pro hi-
bition of male circumcision on religious grounds 'humiliates' the values of others? Or 
would a capitalist mocking Marx and Engels count as such? Did Marx in turn 'humiliate' 
religious people when calling religion 'das Opium des Volkes'? Did Monty Python's Life 
of Brian 'humiliate' Christians? 
I 07 www.un.org/N ews/Press/ docs/20 12/sgsml4518.doc.htm. 
108 Article 19 of the Universal Declaration ofHmnan Rights (1948) reads: "Everyone has the right to freedom 
of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers"; Article 19 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ( 1966) reads: "(I) Everyone shall have the rightto hold 
opinions without interference. (2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall 
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either 
orally, in writing or io priot, io the form of art. or through any other media of his choice. (3) The exercise 
of the rights provided for io paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It 
may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are 
necessary. (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security 
or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals"; Article 20 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights reads: "(I) Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law. (2) Any advocacy 
of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall 
be prohibited by law". 
109 See on the importance of critique: Clifford. William Kingdom, "The Ethics of Belief', io: Stephen, Leslie and 
Frederick Pollock, Eds., Lectures and essays by the late William Kingdon Clifford, Macmillan and co., London 
1901, pp. 163-205. Clifford is discussed io: Cliteur, Paul, The Secular Outlook: In Defense of Moral and 
Political Secularism, Wiley-Blackwell, West Sussex (UK) 2010. 
110 www.oxforddictionaries.com/ definition/ english/humiliate. 
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And what is the legal status of'humiliation' precisely? Does Ban Ki-moon propose to 
introduce a new right, the right 'not to be humiliated in your beliefs'? And where to include 
that in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? 
Although his remarks were a threat to the free exchange of opinions, Ban Ki-moon 
appeared to be in good company. In his response to Innocence of Muslims, president of 
the European Parliament, Martin Schulz (b. 1955), 'condemned strongly not only the 
content but also the distribution of such a movie, which is really humiliating the feelings 
of a lot of people all over the world.'m The problem is not that Ban Ki-moon and Schulz 
took a stance against 'humiliation,' but that they stretched the meaning of that word to 
such an extent that it comes close to an attempt to immunize such an influential symbol 
as a prophet from criticism. But, then again, that might very well be their aim, since Schulz 
literally '[criticized] any attempt to ridicule Islam,'m while Ban Ki-moon said, referring 
to Innocence of Muslims and the Danish cartoons: 'This must stop ... '113 We would be ill-
advised to follow these two leaders in their vision on free speech, for if we did, the possibil-
ities of persuading others on topics of public concern would be enormously reduced. 
CoNCLUDING REMARKS: THE FuTURE OF THIS CoNFLICT 
This contribution is dedicated to an important modern phenomenon: The tension between 
theoterrorist threat and civil liberties, in particular, the freedom of speech and the freedom 
of press. The aim of analyzing the five 'affairs,' the Carrell Affair, the Rushdie Affair, the 
Cartoon Affair, the Jones Affair, and theY oussef Affair, is to show a common pattern. We 
are inclined to affirm that these five cases, usually seen (or rather dismissed) as 'incidents,' 
as having no relation with each other, are somehow connected. It seems not unreasonable 
to speculate (we concede: This is speculation; there is no hard historical proof) that the 
Carrell Affair was the beginning of the Rushdie Affair, and from there, the situation 
developed. One may also say: It is highly unlikely that the successes of the Iranian regime 
in intimidating theN etherlands did not have some impact on the self-esteem of the Iranian 
leaders and stimulate them to take bolder steps (which they actually did two years later in 
the Rushdie case). The idea that the Carrell Affair was a specifically local matter with no 
impact on the Iranians ('Why would they be interested in a silly little country most people 
cannot even locate on the map?') is not very convincing. The Iranian government took an 
interest in what was said about Khomeini in Germany, and on the basis of this firm histor-
Ill www.youtube.com/watch?v~FSd2jK78C48, at 2:28. 
112 "Schulz on the violent attacks against diplomatic missions", 15 September 2012. www.europarl.europa.eu/the-
president/en/press/press_release_speeches/press_release/2012/2012-september/html/schulz-on-the-violent-
attacks-against-diplomatic-missions. 
113 www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sgsml4518.doc.htm. 
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ical fact, it seems likely that they also took an interest in what was being said about them 
in the Netherlands. 
Theoretically, it is possible that at some point in the future material will pop up (from 
government archives or otherwise) which will prove such a historical connection. A pipe 
dream would be, of course, an entry in some sort of diary, kept by Ayatollah Khomeini, 
or someone close to him, with a tenor like this: '24 February 1987. Great success in intim-
idating Dutch infidel nation without firing a shot, or having to kidnap anybody. U nfortu-
nately, proud and stubborn German government did not apologize for disgraceful spoof 
on German TV, but show master himself so afraid that he tried to appease us. Success with 
intimidating the Dutch government stimulates us to think about further steps to take in 
intimidating decadent infidel nations.' 
It is certainly very likely that the intuition of the Dutch minister of foreign affairs was 
entirely right with regard to the seriousness of the situation. But having the right diagnosis 
does not mean you also have the right therapy. And if crisis management was the strategy, 
we may ask: Was it also wise to openly call the Dutch broadcasting corporation, thereby 
showing to the whole world, and also to the theoterrorists, how eager the Dutch government 
was to appease the terrorists? 
From a formal constitutional point of view this was problematic, of course. In a 
democracy, a member of the government (and acting on behalf of the government as a 
whole)114 is not supposed to call the media, and try to influence the way those media report 
on matters of politics or anything else. But that is not the main point we want to make in 
this chapter. This would turn our questions into a manifestation of some sort of scholarly 
Prinzipienreiterei. The point we want to raise, is whether 'only giving advise' to the media 
by politicians is such an innocent practice. Most people think it is. They have the feeling: 
'Why is it wrong to call to the media and friendly ask them to take their responsibilities 
seriously'? The Dutch minister of foreign affairs did not prohibit the Dutch media from 
broadcasting the program critical of Khomeini. There was no compulsion involved. Only 
a call to 'reasonableness.' President Obama also did not force pastor }ones to relinquish 
his plans to burn the Korans. He only made a reasonable appeal for him to not do this. 
What could be better than to have a president who so humbly enters into a social discussion 
with some reasonable arguments? A plan to burn a holy book is a lunatic plan, is it not? 
Why be so 'puritanical' in constitutional matters? 
The answer is: We do not primarily approach this matter from the angle of what is 
constitutionally right or not. Our point is: We think those kinds of phone calls could, in 
all likelihood, have adverse effects. Those phone calls could very well, contrary to the 
114 In a parliamentary democracy the minister acts on behalf of the government. See: Visser, R.K., In dienst van 
het algemeen belang: ministeriiile verantwoordelijkheid en parlementair vertrouwen, Boom, Amsterdam 2008, 
p. 19; Driessche, LA., Politieke ministerii!le verantwoordelijkheid: het Nederlandse begrip in vergelijkend per-
spectief, Kluwer, Deventer 2005, p. 147. 
314 
15 THE NEW CENSORSHIP 
intuition of most people, not mak~ this world a safer place, but more unsafe instead. After 
all, behavior that gets rewarded, gets repeated. Obama, Petraeus, Clinton, Ban Ki-Moon, 
Stchulz and all other politicians who engage in such seemingly innocent discussions on 
what would be a feasible way to behave in such matters, accomplish the complete opposite 
of what they think and hope. What they accomplish is that terrorists will think they are 
on the right track. Imagine what a success it is, from the side of terrorist politics, to have 
the. president of a free country openly calling a citizen to request this citizen to relinquish 
his constitutional rights and behave the way people are supposed to behave in dictatorships, 
Le. to 'koow in advance,' and in their behavior anticipate the preferences of the dictator 
and, although enshrined in the constitution as your right, 'freely' to forfeit that right, 
allegedly on the basis of reasonableness and decency (which are in reality considerations 
of fear; and, what is worse, fear for all to see ).115 
This is precisely what terrorists aim to do: To unsettle the structures in a foreign 
country by means of intimidation. They force a government to do things it would not do 
without that intimidation (as the definition of 'terrorist aim' in Article 83a of the Dutch 
Penal Code rightly points out). 
Now, what governments usually do not do voluntarily is give a piece of territory to a 
group of citizens who have decided that, because they have their own language and culture, 
they want to secede from the national polity.116 That group of separationists decides, 
potentially, to resort to arms. What a government usually does not do voluntarily is to 
denigrate the system of values they have chosen to regulate their community. Usually, 
governments believe in their constitution, in their human rights, in their system of 
democracy. So if in the culture wars, between democracy and theocracy, theocratic terrorists 
manage to force a democratic government to publicly distance itself from, for example, 
the First Amendment of the American constitution (as Obama de facto did in our view) 
or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil 
Rights and Political Rights (again, as Ban Ki-Moon de facto did in our view) this demon-
strates ad oculos to the citizens in theocratic countries that their system is manifestly better 
than the democratic system. If you really believe in democracy and the rule of law, you 
would never speak in such flippant terms about those ideals, would you not? For theocratic 
leaders this is very important. The significance may be seen as purely 'symbolic,' but 
symbols play an important role in politics. 
The message theocratic leaders want to communicate to their population is: People 
living in democracies may have televisions, smartphones, luxurious holiday resorts and 
1!5 As Alan Dershowitz writes: Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, responding to the Challenge, 
Yale University Press, New Haven and London 2002. The difference between "fear" and «fear for all to see" 
is essential from a Machiavellian perspective, of course. 
1!6 Buchanan, Allen, "Theories of Secession", in: Brooks, Thorn, Ed., The Global Justice Reader, Blackwell Pub-
lishing, Maiden, Oxford, Carlton 2008, pp. 94-1!5. 
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fancy cars, they still live in a spiritually arid environment with their wives and daughters 
walking around like prostitutes, while the vilification of the prophet is standard procedure 
by both governments and citizenry, and even their leaders have to confess that au fond 
their system is inferior to the state where God (Allah) illuminates our path. 
This ideological warfare with sometimes violent outbursts may be with us for some 
time to come. Especially in an increasingly religious world. There is - so it seems - still no 
solution for this problem. What these five cases also show is that there seems to be no. 
significant difference between the response of politicians in a relatively insignificant 
country as the Netherlands and their colleagues in the supposedly most powerful country 
on earth, The United States of America. The reactions of relatively inexperienced politicians 
as the members of the Dutch government do not differ significantly from important 
players on the world stage as Obama, Gates, Ban Ki-Moon and Martin Schulz. Whether 
this can be seen as 'good news' or an embarrassment is left to the reader to judge. 
We should not make the mistake to think that the cultural expressions we talk about 
in this chapter are not important enough to defend. This is the most obvious with the 
book-burning pastor, of course. Book-burning, although a practice of all times and all 
places, 117 is a practice that since the Nazi-period is so much associated with Joseph Goebbels 
committing German anti-Nazi authors to the flames that we cannot possibly see pastor 
Jones as some sort of victim. We associate him with one of the darkest pages in human 
history, as an unsympathetic lunatic, at best. This is, to a somewhat lesser degree, also the 
case with the other cultural manifestations we have talked about. People cannot take the 
shows ofRudi Carrell very seriously. It's dubious humor and not high-standing art, one 
would think. That the cartoons were made 'with the sole purpose to hurt,' to 'pain' people, 118 
is a tenacious prejudice not many people are willing to set aside for gaining a better-
informed judgment about the background of the matter. 119 Rushdie is reprimanded for 
being a haughty and self-obsessed person.120 Mark Basseley Y oussef is a fraud, a man with 
a criminal record. So why advocate the 'rights' of such a bunch provocateurs, criminals 
117 Cram er, Frederick H., "Bookburning and Censorship in Ancient Rome: A Chapter from the History ofldeas 
of Speech", in: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Apr., 1945), pp. 157 -196; Fishburn, Matthew, 
Burning Books, Palgrave, MacMillan 2008. 
118 To mention only one example out of many: Seidenfaden, T0ger, "Hard secularism as intolerant civil religion: 
Denmark and the Cartoon Case", in: Porsdam, Helle, Ed., Civil Religion, Human Rights and International 
Relations: Connecting People Across Cultures and Traditions, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, Northampton 
USA 2012, pp. 178-192. 
119 Most people do not know what the stance of the editor of the Jyllands Posten who commissioned the cartoons 
is: Flemming Rose. See: Khader, Naser, and Flemming Rose, «Reflections on the Danish Cartoon ControversY', 
in: Middle East Quarterly, Fall2007, pp. 59-66. This is one of the most uninteresting articles for most people 
to read: Rose, Flemming, "Why I Published Those Cartoons", in: Washingtonpost.com, Sunday, February 
19, 2006. 
120 This point was made by one of the smartest people of our time whose smartness did not transpire in this 
contribution to the discussion on the fatwa: Durnmett, Michael, "Open Letter to Rushdie", in: Theindependent, 
11 February 1990. 
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and, at best, reckless men, in s~ch a fanatical way? Is this not to take Enlightenment too 
seriously, thereby transforming it into Enlightenment -fundamentalism ?121 W mild that not 
take our 'Voltairian,' 'I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your 
right to say it' a little too far? 
As we said, we think this is a mistake. The problem is, what starts with insignificant 
trifles will end with serious matter: With Galileo, 122 Bruno123 and Servet.124 We are already 
there, in fact, when we see that it proved possible to stifle several dissident voices in the 
fields of religious sensibilities and religious criticism. Yale University Press did not include 
the Danish cartoons in scholarly work.125 A book on, mind you, cartoons in general, does 
not contain the most notorious cartoons of our time. 126 When BBC director general Mark 
Thompson was asked by the historian Timothy Garton Ash whether he, Thompson, would 
not air a show about the prophet Mohammed that was 'comparably satirical' to ferry 
Springer: The Opera, which was broadcast by the BBC in 2005 and received tens of thousands 
of complaints for its 'irreverent treatment of Christian themes,' Thompson said: 'Essentially 
the answer to that question is yes.' Thompson argued: Without question, "I complain in 
the strongest possible terms," is different from "I complain in the strongest possible terms 
and I am loading my AK4 7 as I write".'127 Salman Rushdie never made a The Satanic Verses 
If (and no publisher would have published it, to be sure). Kurt Westergaard never made 
a second cartoon comparable to his first one. So, it seems that - for the time being -
theoterrorist intimidation is still fairly successfrll. 
There are glimmers of hope, though. Humorous satire proves to be such a powerful 
force 128 that new manifestations keep popping up (one may think of the Jesus and Mo 
121 This is the tenor of: Gray, John," A Clash of ideologies: 'the Enlightenment' versus Islamism", in: The National, 
2 July2010; Gray, John, "Evangelical atheism, secular Christianity'', in: Gray, John, Gray'sAnatomy: Selected 
Writings, Allanl.ane, Penguin Books, London 2009, pp. 292-307; Gray, John, "Monolithic secularism uosuited 
to today's Europe", Interview with John Gray by Nathan Gardels, in: New Perspectives Quarterly, 28 April 
2004. 
122 Forced to abjure his theses in 1633 before the Inquisition in Rome. See: Russell, Bertrand, The Scientific 
Outlook, Roudedge, London and New York 2001 (1931), p. 18. 
123 Burned at the stake in Rome. See: Rowland, lngrid D., Giordano Bruno: Philosopher/Heretic, Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, NewYork2008. 
124 Burned in 1553 on the instigation of Calvin. See: Zweig, Stefan, Castellio gegen Calvin oder Ein Gewissen 
gegen die Gewalt, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1983 (1936). 
125 Klausen, Jytte, The Cartoons that Shook the World, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 2009 did 
not comprise the cartoons itself although the author, for scholarly reasons, had wanted to include them in 
the book. The publisher refused. 
126 Navasky, VictorS., The Art of Controversy: Political Cartoons and the their Enduring Power, Alfred A. Knopf, 
NewYork2013. 
127 "Mark Thompson: BBC director general admits Christianity gets tougher treatment", The Telegraph, 
27 February 2012, www. telegraph.co.uk/ culture/tvandradio/bbc/91 07689/Mark-Thompson-BBC-director-
general-admits-Christianity-gets-tougher-treatment.html. 
128 Davies, Christie, "The Danish cartoons, the Muslims and the new batde ofjudand", in: Humor, 21-1 (2008), 
pp. 2-7; Morreall, John, Comic Relief A Comprehensive Philosophy ofHumor, Wiley-Blackwell, Maiden/Oxford 
2009. 
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cartoons). Who would have thought that after the Cartoon Affair, a new satire of the 
prophet would appear on the Internet? Who could predict that book-burning would ever 
force us to fundamentally consider our commitment to civil liberties? This can be seen as 
fruitful- at least intellectually. 
Of course, we do not want to say that we are fond of all satire - certain manifestations 
are certainly of poor quality. We also do not consider book-burning an elevated form of 
artistic expression; far from it. 
But that is not what this is all about. All of the time, everywhere, new controversial 
expressions, films, works of art, scholarly treaties and essays are being produced. It is highly 
unrealistic to think that governments can 'regulate' the production and diffusion of these 
works and ideas. They could not effectively do so in the Enlightenment, and cannot do so 
now. The Internet adds to that. This means that every 'solution' to a crisis is always tem-
poral. The Dutch minister of foreign affairs will have had the feeling that he 'solved' the 
problem. He did not. At least, he might have 'solved' a crisis - in crisis management -style 
- but he did not solve the underlying problem. He passed it on to the British. And the 
British passed it on to someone else. Now, in the J ones Affair and the Y oussef Affair, the 
Americans are struggling with the problem. 
Governments should understand that imposing limitations on free speech- regardless 
of its relative effectiveness in the short run, mainly the success of catapulting the threat to 
your neighbors- erodes the foundations of a free society. They should realize that extraju-
diciallimitations ultimately amount to the same as their legal counterparts: They not only 
unduly restrict the exercise of free speech but deregulate the whole system of government. 
This 'new censorship' is not about explicitly limiting free speech, that is, by force of law, 
but about restricting it in a more subtle manner, using all sorts of'requests,' 'suggestions,' 
condemnations, and allegations to make people relinquish their free speech rights them-
selves. This is something Europe, and especially, the bulwark of free speech, the United 
States, should be deeply concerned about. And this is what is at stake in such seemingly 
frivolous things as the jokes of Carrell, Rushdie' s novel, the cartoon of W estergaard, the 
film of Van Gogh, the actions of Terry Jones, and the video of Mark Basseley Youssef. 
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